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certain extent, made clear by Messrs. Newman and Miller. I say to a certain extent,
because in this phase of the subject time has not dealt gently with the authors. Thus
they discuss at some length the struggle over the relation between the armed services and
the Commission. The matter is of continuing significance. Yet while the desires of
Congress for civilian dominance of the Commission are reflected in the Act, this Com-
mission has been obliged to devote perhaps as much attention to the development of
atomic weapons as a commission solely military in character. Realization of this fact
is all-important to an understanding both of the domestic operation of the Act and of its
international implications. Publication procedures, however, apparently forced the
authors to bury this revealing development in three scattered footnotes. "For good or
ill the Commission's production planning is currently simplified by its announced policy
of devoting almost its entire resources to the manufacture of atomic weapons."'4  Like
the two other footnotes, the one here quoted deserves much greater prominence, much
fuller treatment; the hurrying reader will miss it altogether.
In the section dealing with control of information the authors make clear Congress's
"obsession with the safeguarding of secrets," 5 an obsession which leads to the enactment
of truly "draconic" penalties for violations of the Act. The reviewer also finds himself
in hearty accord with the authors that "the greatest danger by far in the matter of
exchanges between scientists lies in a policy of unreasonable and unreasoned secrecy, a
policy that may end by defeating the very purpose it was expected to serve-the main-
tenance of American leadership in the field of atomic energy.' 6 Such arguments, however,
may at this time be interesting but academic. Only an abrupt and unforeseen change in
Russian policy will make practicable any fundamental revision in American preoccupa-
tion with matters of national security.
Since The Control of Atomic Energy was written, the question of the future course of
Russian-American relations has loomed so large that its effect has inevitably been felt, not
only on the course of discussions concerning the international control of atomic energy,
but also on the operation of the American act as well. There is abundant room and
great need for further study of this effect. Mr. Newman and Mr. Miller, who have seen
so clearly into the implications of the atomic revolution, are most competent to undertake
the task.
Department of Politics,. EDGAR S. FuRuiss, JR.
Princeton University.
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The duel between the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad and Louis D.
Brandeis is a dramatic chapter in the history of the corporation and the career of the later
associate justice. It has the appeal of personal conflict: in this corner, Charles S. Mellen,
the president of the monopoly, and J. Pierpont Morgan, his trainer; in that, Louis D.
Brandeis, the young challenger, a disinterested crusader for the people. It has the
advantage of compactness. Here is no long survey of historical development. Instead we
have only the last act. At the outset the New Haven was a powerful, sacrosanct New
England institution, paying 8 per cent dividends to, among others, widows, orphans, and
trust estates. Seized by a delirium for consolidation, the railroad now proceeded to
acquire coastal steamship lines and the trolley systems of southern New England. Finally,
in 1907, it bought a large stock interest in the Boston & Maine, the major system of
northern New England, and controlled that railroad by various devices for nearly seven
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years. The struggle to-prevent this last amalgamation furnishes the major theme of this
volume. In any case, by 1914 the mighty had been brought low. Weakened by internal
extravagances, the rotten structure was pushed over by legislative hostility, investigations
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and a threatened suit under the Sherman Anti-
trust Act. Brandeis, who might well say, "All this I was," was left in possession of the
battlefield-triumphant and justified. If this summary seems unduly jocund, the David-
and-Goliath tone of this volume is in part responsible.
Of the immense value of the Brandeis crusade there can be, in retrospect, no doubt.
As people's attorney he challqnged the respectability, smugness, and mental inertia of
the wise, the true, and the good. He confronted a corporation, ably managed and advised
by skilled counsel, and one which concealed its march towards consolidation in a labyrinth
of affiliates, fraudulent bookkeeping, and deceitful public statements. Operating with a
minimum of support and upon a mere handful of data, Brandeis successfully drove a
wedge into this impregnable, monolithic structure. When his and other exposures were
done the New Haven was successfully convicted of political bribery, financing ostensibly
"independent" experts and pressure groups, misleading public reports, deceit if not
downright lawlessness, assorted episodes of railroad jobbery, and the careless expenditure
of other people's money. In a public corporation, subject to control by national and
state law and by national and state commissions, these acts were more than irresponsible;
they shattered the premises upon which charters were granted to such enterprises. Re-
spectable opinion in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts should have welcomed these
disclosures. Staples and Mason do well to rescue them from scattered and forbidding
sources.
Sympathy is a prerequisite to understanding. Thus armed the historian should ap-
proach the periods, and biographers the individuals, with which they deal. But the
complete allegiance borne by the authors to Brandeis, to his case against monopoly
in general, and to his attack upon the New Haven as monopoly in particular illustrates
the error of confusing sympathy with identification. To minor matters this tendency
gives pervasive, if elusive, partisan coloration. Thus Mellen's devotion to monopoly is
fanaticism; Brandeis' hostility is apparently based upon reason. Though Mellen is be-
latedly exonerated of diabolism, others who rejected the Brandeis case or failed to con-
form to his strategy .are given short shrift. The Massachusetts Commission on Commerce
and Industry of 19o7, which blessed the consolidation movement for its economic advan-
tages, is blithely discredited with the observation that it was composed of lawyers and
investors in the New Haven Railroad. From Hearst's Boston American the authors have
adopted this cheap and shallow analysis. There is no hint that one of the members, G. G.
Crocker, had been chairman of the Railroad Commission of Massachusetts and won the
commendation of the mugwump Springfield Republican, and that another, Charles
Francis Adams, had had a distingiished career as chairman of the Commission, was a
forme" railroad executive and a maverick at that, and had devoted decades to a study
of railroad problems in Massachusetts and elsewhere. The thoroughness of his informa-
tion surpassed Brandeis', and he was quite as capable of disinterested thought. Even by
the evidence supplied in this volume, the Commission was appointed by Curtis Guild,
who, as Governor, sounded the alarm against the New Haven months before Brandeis
was interested in the issue. By the same token, the failure of the Taft administration to
proceed, as Brandeis wished, against the New Haven under the Sherman Antitrust Act
is explained by the fact "that the Department of Justice under the Taft-Wickersham
aegis was inspired with the mildest trust-busting ambition"-at best a highly dubious
obiter dictum.
In judging the methods of the Brandeis-New Haven contest I get the impression,
furthermore, that Staples' and Mason are not quite willing to let sauce for the goose be
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sauce for the gander. Should Brandeis inspire labor leaders to pressure the legislators,
that is good; should Senator Henry Cabot Lodge put the steam on from Washington, that
is bad. When Brandeis manipulates the threadbare symbolism of the notion that New
England's roads must not fall into alien hands, the danger is real; when Mellen raises
the same banner, he is parading a bogey-man. If a vice president of the road begins
his testimony with the quite understandable statement, "I don't propose to stultify myself
by coming here and admitting I have been guilty of unlawful acts," he is arrogant. When
Mellen announces he could get the legislation he wanted at Washington because "I
could have proved my case," the statement becomes one of somehow sinister power.
I suspect the root of the matter is that the authors have failed to give serious enough
attention to the case for a degree of monopoly in the railroad business. Thus they admira-
bly summarize in the last chapter the Brandeis philosophy of competition: Competition
means innovation, progress comes from struggle, absolute power breeds arrogance, small-
ness is more efficient than bigness. In spite of the ambivalent evidence which the authors
sometimes marshal for these charges, they are generally loyal to the philosophy. Still,
"They know not England who only England know." The arguments for a contrary
policy are never organized. If they emerge at all from the narrative they are inci-
dental, piecemeal, particular, and, by implication, self-interested. But the case for
monopoly was based upon considerations of social and economic welfare. It was also
derived from decades of experience with railroad competition. Albert Fink, A. T. Had-
ley, and Charles F. Adams, hardly to be written off as intellectual lightweights, had
all observed the competitive process and come to the conclusion that the railroad was
different from other types of business. There could not be an indefinite number of com-
peting railroads as there could be of factories. Investors in railroads could not transfer
capital flexibly to other enterprises as in manufacturing. Railroad competition was from
the beginning cutthroat and destructive. The proved results were a chaotic irregularity
and inequity of rates, the multiplication of needless railroads, bankruptcies, and receiver-
ships, and eventually an agreement between competitors. Combination brought order;
government control of railroad practices would prevent extortion. To men of this
informed opinion, the application of the Brandeis generalizations to the railroad network
was somewhat archaic, probably naive, and certainly irrelevant.
This was the verdict of history--as they read it. They dealt with a longer run of
time than does the present volume, only a short chronological chapter. The monopoly
here dissected began decades before Mellen and Morgan. The merging of railroad lines
commenced in the Seventies and most of the steamships were acquired in the Nineties.
By goo the cost of consolidation and technical improvements on the Consolidated, as the
New Haven was called, were already so staggering that dividends were reduced from xo
to 8 per cent. Mellen and Morgan simply continued the process at a faster and a more
reckless pace. But, as the history of American monopoly has demonstrated, an extrava-
gance of methods is not necessarily inherent in the monopolizing process. The New
England railroad monopolies failed, not because they were monopolies, but because of
the fashion in which they were assembled. They collapsed also because of profound
changes in the means of transportation and in the economics of the region they served.
No railroad executive at the beginning of this century could be expected to foresee the
impact of the automobile or the comparative stagnation of New England industry. Thus
the New Haven and the Boston & Maine both collapsed in the Thirties from the weight
of their past misdeeds and the inadequacies of the present in which they operated. It is
hard to see how an earlier and more rigorous application of the Brandeis competitive
formula could have prevented this outcome or provided the shippers, producers, and
investors of New England with a sounder system. EDwA C. KIRKArND.
Bowdoin College.
